The North Sea Flood of January 1953 was the largest natural disaster in UK twentieth century history, accounting directly for 307 deaths on land alone. The event highlighted huge inadequacies in sea defences and disaster policy within the UK and the resultant Waverley Report formed the basis of modern UK disaster policy. Despite the lack of central government involvement in rescue efforts and the apparent non-existence of co-ordinated rescue plans, little blame or accountability was assigned. Due to the relative infancy of the mass media and the post war time frame the disaster is often overlooked by modern commentators from both academia and wider society.
INTRODUCTION:
"...to study contemporary changes we must be able to identify initiating events." 2 The North Sea Flood of 1953 was the worst natural disaster to impact the UK in the twentieth century, accounting directly for 307 deaths on land. As well as the high death toll, the flooding, which occurred primarily between the Tees and Dover on the East coast of the United Kingdom during the night of the . The same weather system also heavily hit the lowlands of North
Western Europe causing catastrophic consequences especially to the Netherlands; however this paper focuses solely on the events in the UK and attempts to frame the cultural legacy of this disaster.
The event highlighted huge inadequacies in both physical sea defences and in central government disaster policy. Despite the response to the flooding being predominantly community led and the fact that by the time central government became involved, most of the search and rescue effort had been completed, little blame was assigned to either individuals or agencies involved. The post war setting of the event and the relative infancy of the mass media meant that the flood has become almost forgotten in the public conscience of UK twentieth century history. However, analysis of the flood, flood response and its lasting influence on subsequent policy shows that it was in fact a decisive moment for British disaster policy.
As well as disaster policy, general attitudes of accountability and blame have grown significantly in the the changes in public expectations of disaster response will be charted. Although similar discourses occurred worldwide over this time frame, the 1953 flood directly introduced the British people to the theoretical ideas being posed by academics such as Bucher. 4 Using a holistic approach combining the sociological, political and scientific narratives it is hoped that nationwide changes, which have occurred in the last fifty years can be charted back to the trigger event of the 1953 east coast flood.
Risk Perception:
Traditionally, psychologists, decision theorists and economists have all independently studied the concepts behind risk perception. As the field has grown it has become more inter-disciplinary, incorporating ideas from anthropologists, geographers and sociologists.
The earliest writings on risk perception were almost exclusively framed from the perspective of engineers, partly due to the fact that this was the first field to practically look at safety and risk reduction, but also largely due to the influence of a paper by Starr in 1969 which looked at the social benefit versus the technological risk of implementing new technology. Starr introduced the idea of the irrationality behind risk decisions through the example of nuclear power compared to cigarette smoking, where scientifically and statistically speaking smoking has a much larger risk of death but in the public conscience it is nuclear power that is feared.
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This idea continued to grow and the modern writings can be easily split into two areas. The first of these and probably the most frequently found is the idea of a public ignorance of the scientific or technical aspects of an issue. The "deficit" model of public understanding, as discussed by Irwin (1995) , amongst others, in his book Citizen Science: A Study of People, argues that this gap in knowledge between scientists and the public is not entirely constructed out of ignorance from the public but is also contributed to by aligning policy completely with science, and not accounting for ethics in complex situations.
The second area, more commonly associated with economists rather than other hard-scientists, 6 is that public reactions to controversial technologies are not based around irrationality or ignorance but in fact around economical rationale, which extends from the idea of compensation for a reduction of utility that may occur if a new technology is used. This chain of thought is linked into the phenomena of LULUs (locally unwanted land use) and NIMBYs (not in my back yard) that have grown over the last twenty years. 7 The first social scientists to express ideas on risk perception were psychologists, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) who contributed largely to assumptions about public irrationality with their development of the idea of heuristics. Heuristics are rule of thumb responses that humans often give in certain situations, and although technically built on millennia of human evolution, these thought processes often carry a bias that is unable to deal with modern complex decisions. The most applicable of Tversky and
Kahneman's work on heuristics and one that has been investigated by subsequent psychologists working in risk perception, is the availability heuristic. Suggesting that people base their prediction of the frequency of an event or the proportion within a population, on how easily an example can be brought to mind. For example people often rate the chance of death by plane crash higher than that of death by car accident despite the statistical grounding that shows death is much more likely from a car accident. 8 More recently, psychologists in the field have criticised availability heuristics as a theoretical tool that highlights people's perceptions and not always real actions. Despite this criticism, such as Lopes ' (1991) Rhetoric of Irrationality where it is stated heuristics are over cited, this psychological assessment behind risk perception still held many advocates well into the 1990s.
It is from these critiques of the heuristic view of risk perception that sociological study of the field has grown, with increasing emphasis being placed on the analysis of larger community perceptions rather than individual thought processes. Slovic (1987) acknowledges the growing multidisciplinary aspects of risk perception and thus takes the psychologists heuristic theories and places them in larger sociological settings. Slovic attempts, as other sociologists of the time also noted, to show the scientific elite that the publics' risk perception is not an irrational case of availability heuristics but rather that the public conscience diverts hugely from science in its definition and criteria of risk. Experts on a specific risk area This truly holistic aim has now been reached in the fields of risk perception and risk management; however, when referring to natural disasters, especially in a country such as the UK where disasters are relatively rare, the concepts of blame, recreancy and accountability are much more poignant. Douglas (1992) without referring specifically to the UK academically frames this idea in her essay Muffled Ears, where she discusses the issues of how individuals and societies perceive low probability events.
Blame, Recreancy and Accountability:
It is a small jump in the literature from the concept of risk perception prior to an event or project, to the post event allocation of blame. 11 Commentators have debated to what extent risk perception prior to an event contributes to societal blame of institutes and governments after an event. Bickerstaff (2004) provides an overview of some of these points when analysing her research of air pollution in the UK.
Here, she supports Walker et al. (1998) in their analysis that links economically and socially disadvantaged groups to both high levels of distrust in central risk policy and in allocation of blame.
The first paper to implicitly discuss blame in reference to disasters was Since 1957, work on blame assigning in disasters has progressed from the position that in a natural disaster the causal agent is seen to be natural forces and therefore blame is assigned to God, 13 to the idea that a disaster whether technological or natural is an all encompassing event that is a socially constructed problem. Blocker and Sherkat (1992) does not take into account the interface between nature and humans. Oliver-Smith then goes on to highlight that much disaster research looks at solving symptoms rather than causes, a stance at odds with the Natural Disasters Research Council report, which highlights a shift to mitigation strategies over the previous decade. Posing the question is a disaster a natural event or purely constructed by society, the author explores ideas of vulnerability in a disaster situation; extending the concepts proposed by Wijkman & Timberlake (1988) and Blocker & Sherkat (1992) amongst others.
Nash (2006) presents an environmental historical view of the ideas that Oliver-Smith cites in reference to disaster as an all encompassing, multidimensional occurrence that sweeps across environmental, social, economical, political, and biological aspects of life. Nash's work although not specifically about disaster, aims to highlight how man is inescapably linked to larger ecosystems and whilst man has shaped the land and changed it almost completely in areas, the local environment can still cause disease and suffering.
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The Media:
The growth of blame, accountability and recreancy in both the public conscience and scientific literature over the past fifty years has been coupled with many technological and standard of living improvements. One of the most correlatable of these technological advancements is the rise of mass media, such as radio, television and the internet, several authors have written on its role in disaster research and blame apportioning.
Singer and Endreny (1993) conducted a survey of media reporting to try and establish what kind of hazards the media report, how accurate their reporting is, and who is held responsible for hazards and their prevention. Their findings interestingly show that generally the media reports hazards in an "inaccurate" way and leaves critical figures such as probability of the events occurrence out. They also found that blame is rarely assigned by the media in natural disaster events, however it is worth noting that their samples were taken from 1960 and 1984 and so results are not indicative of current media trends. 20 Button (2002) looks at how the media re-frames technological disasters, and shows that the media can shift the general public's perception of disaster events in a relatively short space of time; adding that too much emphasis is placed today on professional opinion, when in many cases a local knowledge could better add to our understanding of why an event has occurred. The frames created by the media only serve to reinforce our cultural ideologies and prevent the public from inquiring why victims are vulnerable in the first instance. Stallings (1996) further defines the media framing of disasters, introducing the term coupling as the media phenomena post disaster that takes two facts or trends and presents them as having proven links. This working hypothesis being presented as fact by the media can result in misplaced or over apportioned blame in public response. Stallings provides an empirical example of the coupling phenomena in his 1990 paper about structural failures of bridges in the US. Also talking of proximity, he states that the lower down the rung an agent is, the easier it is to assign blame and that as a result, the media look for acts that are proximate to couple with the disaster. In Fischer and Harr (1994) an empirical study is presented showing that despite media coverage of an event being largely positive or neutral, the small amount of negative reports disproportionately affected the public's opinion.
Alongside eyewitness accounts and interviews it is predominantly through the relatively infant mass media's myopic lens that the North Sea Flood of 1953 is analysed.
The North Sea Flood -31 st January 1953:
The flood of the evening of the 31 st January to 1 st February 1953, which affected predominantly the eastern counties of Lincolnshire, Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex and Kent, was caused by a combining of two meteorologically distinct events. The first of these was a depression and subsequent anticyclone wind system that developed in the Atlantic, travelled around the North of Scotland 21 and then intensified as it was funnelled south along the East coast of the UK. Both Rossiter (1953) and provide detailed charts of the weather systems that developed along the coastline of the UK with Steers stating that, "it was the worst northerly gale on record in the British Isles."
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The depression combined with a spring tide along the east coastline, the height of which many harbours and the Met office had under-predicted. In Southend the observed tide ultimately was 2.4 metres higher than had been forecast. 23 Due to, the shallow nature of the North Sea, the localised decrease in atmospheric pressure from the cyclone and the high tide combined, the level of the North Sea rose by 2 metres south of the Humber with waves reaching over 4.9m.
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As the surge travelled south along the east coast it increased in intensity and size. Its first impact with the shore was as dusk was falling at Spurn Head, Yorkshire around 16:00; it reached its maximum of 2.46 metres near Kings Lynn, Norfolk at 19.20, and caused much of its destruction along the Essex coast in the early hours, especially at Canvey Island where it struck at 01.10 on the 1 st February.
The first casualty of the weather system was the MV Princess Victoria which sank on its crossing from Stranraer, Scotland to Larne, Northern Ireland, resulting in 133 deaths. 25 Despite the Princess Victoria being abandoned at 14:00 on the 31 st January and the surge hitting the east coast as early as 16:00 in Yorkshire no warning was given to any of the settlements further down the coast. As many of the southern towns of the Thames estuary settled down for a night of, "...gale-force winds, severe in many places, and squally showers, mainly of hail or snow…" the storm surge hit with devastating consequences.
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There were 1200 breaches of defences along the coastline 27 the extent of which are shown by Figure 1 .
Much of this coastline had neglected sea defences due to lack of investment during the war period and many of the worst affected communities were housed in temporary prefabricated or bungalow accommodation due to post war housing shortages. highlights that of the 307 deaths on land, 216 (70%) of these occurred in five main clusters, as shown respectively on Figure 1 , at:
Mablethorpe and Sutton on Sea (16 dead), Hunstanton and Snettisham (65 dead), Felixstowe and Harwich (over 40 dead), Jaywick (37 dead) and Canvey Island (58 dead). A detailed account of the meteorology of the event is given by Rossiter (1953) whilst detailed descriptions of the event and response to the flood are comprehensively covered by , Grieve (1959), and Pollard (1978) . Along with the BBC Timewatch documentary, The Greatest Storm (2002) these provide more than sufficient information for the interested reader.
The response to the flooding was predominantly community led, as highlighted by the volunteers shown in Figure 2 , with limited liaising between districts and without the central Government becoming involved until the Monday morning after the storm and flooding had struck on the Saturday evening.
Across the whole area came reports of great personal sacrifice and heroism in the face of adversity; US Air-Force servicemen, from their base at Scunthorpe, were some of the first to respond to the disaster, reaching the lower Hunstanton area within under an hour. 29 Corporal Leeming becoming the first nonBritish recipient of the George medal, despite being a non-swimmer he saved 27 people in the region in a rubber raft that he self inflated.
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The overarching narrative of the time was one of community resilience and solidarity, the Blitz spirit 31 so prevalent during the war re-emerged as a community survival mechanism. By framing the flood events in the wartime ideals of resilience, adaptability and resourcefulness, the communities' worst affected showed a reaction to adversity that clearly contrasts the strong individual vulnerability, prevalent in the modern discourse. Pollard, 1978 Analysis of eyewitness accounts; both from the time of the event, taken from the BBC sound archive's collection of radio newsreel, and from more recent interviews, such as the BBC Timewatch documentary
The Greatest Storm (2002) both highlight this community attitude. An attitude and immediate response to the disaster from the worst affected and often poorest sectors of society which is alien in today's climate of blame and accountability. Exemplified by the Reverend J.W. Bell from Burnham-on-Crouch, who when interviewed for BBC radio spoke of a terrifying experience but of the "wonderful courage and fortitude of his rescuers" (emphasis added). 32 It is worth noting that interviews conducted whilst much of the death and hardship was still unfolding may be lacking in assignation of blame due to the shock and proximity of the tragedy. With this in mind, regional newspapers have been turned to in analysis as a more formal and controlled outlet by which to assess the attitudes of those affected.
Regional Press:
Both the Canvey News & Benfleet Recorder, and the Felixstowe Times had run articles in the weeks prior to the flood about delays in sea-defence improvements 33 due to the governments circular issued during the steel shortage of June 1952 notifying local authorities that any defences requiring steel would have to be slowed down. 34 This highlights that even prior to the events of 31 st January 1953 many of the local authorities affected knew both of the dilapidated post war condition of their sea defences and of the delays to restoring these protecting structures.
In the weeks following the disaster the regional newspapers along the east coast, most of them weeklies, acted as an inter-community information and communication system. Printing stories focussed solely on facts and figures, with little polemic and devoting much page space to notices from relocated businesses and families trying to locate relatives. Hall (1992) states how journalism plays a pivotal role in the circulation of dominant discourses in a society and Ewart (2000) provides an empirical study of how a regional newspaper, shapes a communities discourse and views as a more trusted representation than the often distrusted metropolitan or national media. This notion is clearly prevalent in the regional papers of 1953 who carried messages of hope and resilience for the communities, as are expressed in The Felixstowe Times "flood special" on the 7 th of February which ran the headline, "The people's spirit was unbroken amid the scene of havoc..."
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The community resilience and positive reporting shown by these newspapers however, is not that dissimilar to today where many regional newspapers have a close affinity to their readership and often are lacking in more obvious political stance or policy criticisms, other than those affecting their insular interests.
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Owing to this, the national newspapers post 31 st January 1953 were analysed to try and establish a broader representation of cultural opinion to the events. Especially as the flood was declared a national disaster by the government, when only a relatively small proportion of the population was affected;
approximately 32,000 people were evacuated out of a national population of 49 million.
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National Press:
In a similar vein to the regional newspapers, the first few days after the floods were dominated by articles in both the tabloids and broadsheets detailing the facts and figures of events on the East coast.
The national newspapers dedicated large sections to coverage of the flooding and a typical format was that of the front page of the Daily Express from the 2 nd February, with the headline, "The Deluge"
followed by bullet points highlighting discrete facts such as the death poll [sic] and the approximate amount of homes affected. 38 Many also ran double page spreads of photographs showing graphically the scale and extent of the devastation caused by the storm and surge (figure 3).
It can be garnered from the public's response in the newspapers, both to appeals for aid and through letters featured, that even in places geographically detached from the devastation a deep kinship and camaraderie was apparent. Within a week £125,000 had been donated by the British public to the Lord Mayor's Flood and Tempest Distress Fund. This resilient community spirit both regionally and nationally was as Furedi (2007) attributes to sin and taboo, the discourse of religious faith, stating that this is eventually replaced in western industrialised nations by the more neutral, uniform vocabulary of risk and blame.
To leave the cultural analysis of the great flood as a purely blame free discourse, attributed both to the existence of wartime resolve and religious designation would be extremely naive. It has long been accepted that blame is a, "usual, if not inevitable, feature of disasters," 41 therefore what is key is how this blame culturally and socially has manifested itself throughout differing societies.
Further analysis shows that, as the newspaper's commentary on the flood continues-over time becoming more dissociated from the human face of the tragedy-elements of blame and questioning of authority seep into the text. These misgivings first start to appear in the regional press about three weeks after the flooding in the form of reviews and polite suggestions aimed toward parliament. The coroner for Felixstowe made the point in his inquest that he would not allow questions tending to establish blame, however in his verdict the foreman went on to state, "...that the authorities should institute a system of warning to be put into operation whenever circumstances similar to those pertaining on the night...arise in the future." 42 This is not an assignation of implicit blame that would be recognisable in today's society, such as those brandished at the Met Office after the Great Storm of 1987, but is still an outlet for feelings that however underlying in the cultural narrative of the day were clearly simmering below the surface of resilience.
This tepid and somewhat relatively restrained form of accusation and blame casting is apparent much earlier than three weeks after the flooding in the national press. The Daily Mail ran the headline, "Could The speaker also intervened in the house to stop matters of a national disaster becoming a party matter.
The 5 th of February saw most nationals continuing their coverage of the ongoing debate in the House of Commons, which had now extended to attacking the Conservatives circular of the previous June which in light of national steel shortages had effectively stopped the strengthening of the dilapidated sea defences. It seems that these initial attempts to apportion blame and accountability close to the event, however softly aired, were quickly tempered and countered by those in the firing line.
Post 1953 Extreme Weather Events:
When compared with subsequent extreme weather events in the UK, the national newspapers response and representations of the public's opinions in the aftermath of the great flood exhibit stark contrast.
On 11 th January 1978 a similar weather system to that of 1953 progressed down the east coast of the UK again causing much damage but no loss of life due to the now fully functioning national flood warning system. In many regions the storm surge tides were marginally higher than those experienced in 1953. The newspapers also carried stories about claiming insurance damage and how to ensure that this was done before delays due to the large volume of claims occurred. Whether the rise of blame in society is now a widespread and uniform discourse or if its prevalence is still growing is not easily distinguishable. The above comparisons of events in 1953, 1978 and 1987 suggests its continued growth over the industrial to post-industrial time frame, however has this accusation system now become stagnant and accepted or is it still dynamic and growing?
The (2005) states, "a footnote in the history of post-war Britain," its long term legacy for both physical sea-defences and disaster policy were of huge significance to the UK. Through analysis of the review process which followed the events of the 31 st January 1953, the bills created and general political legacy of the event, it is hoped that further insight can be made into how this event helped trigger a paradigm shift of the British public psyche toward rhetoric of vulnerability and blame. It also handed much of the responsibility for the initial sea defence repairs to the regional River Board
Authorities, and outlined where extra funding for works would be available from. This bill may have seemingly been an attempt, by a national government which was slow to assist regional bodies in what it quickly labeled a national disaster, to pacify the affected areas by providing them with the power and funds to start repairs immediately. The bill wording itself, however, provides little evidence of this, being written purely as a legal facilitating document, with little scope for the view that its speed in being passed through parliament was due to guilt or blame shifting rather than the real need for urgent works on the affected coasts. As well as the more direct and tangible results, the Waverly report is responsible for many other, more subtle developments in both policy implementation, terminology and report language, that can be deemed pioneering. In its consideration of where and to what level to improve defences, it takes into account financial factors and can therefore be regarded a prototype to the modern practice of the benefit-cost approach to flood defence management. 64 Using terminology such as fair, reasonably and practicable, the Waverley committee were pre-empting the field of Risk Assessment and its language that was to become so prevalent worldwide throughout the 1970s. 65 The Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974 defines all its measures with the phrase "reasonably practicable" a term that would not have looked out of place in the Waverley report some twenty years earlier.
It is difficult to extract direct accusations of blame from modern government reports as their remit is often, "to review lessons to be learned" (Figure 4 ) or similar directives, as it was with the Waverley Report in 1953. 66 However, it is possible to read further into the text, linking the report with other background information.
As mentioned in the newspaper analysis previously, a government circular was issued in June 1952
stating that due to a national steel shortage, all local authorities should cease any coastal defence works until further notice. 67 Despite this memo coming under criticism directly in the House of Commons from labour politicians such as Bevan, the Waverley report makes no mention of the halt that had been imposed on all sea defence repairs nationally. If this had occurred in today's individualist climate it is seemingly obvious, by looking into the response to the 1987 great storm, 68 that not only would it have been picked up in the report, but also it is plausible that a responsible civil servant or politician may have been forced to resign.
The idea that politics and policy is learning from the event without the implicit allocation of blame or with individual's being directly responsible, which can be found in extreme weather events post 1953, is in line with the narrative of recreancy which was not defined until 1993. 69 The literature on risk and blame narrates a discourse of societies progressing from implicit blame allocation to the more useful and positive notion of recreancy. As the response to the flood of 1953 shows signs of recreancy in its, "lessons to be learned" stance coupled with few signs of public allocation of blame it may seem that the academics discourse advocated by Freudenberg and Douglas 70 of societal blame developing through the post industrial time frame to recreancy is inaccurate.
DISCUSSION:
The North Sea flood as a catalyst for social change:
Penning-Rowsell et al. (2006) the large death toll. 71 If this event could clearly act as an unparalleled trigger for UK disaster policy, then can it be extrapolated that such a large event could actually trigger a paradigm shift in the social fabric of the UK from communities of resilience to a climate of blame?
In order to be able to clearly see whether trends analysed, in the aftermath of 31 st January 1953 and its lasting affect, acted as a trigger for social changes it is first necessary to frame these events within larger social shifts of the decade. There are two extremely relevant and large changes that were occurring in the post war period in which the flood occurred; these were the growth of the middle classes and the augmentation of a national mass media.
Post war the growth of the mass media had increased exponentially, a trend which into the 1950s saw television overtaking radio in popularity. In 1950 there were 350,000 combined sound and vision licenses; by 1954 this number had exceeded 3 million. 72 Coupled with this growth in both television and radio, national press continued its wartime trends of overtaking and replacing regional print. National Sunday newspapers circulation peak was 30.59 million in 1951, whilst national morning newspapers peaked in 1957 at 16.71million. 73 This shift to an immediate reporting of the news, throughout the whole country whether by newspaper, radio or television meant that national identities and discourses on current affairs were strengthened.
Mass communication it has been argued creates a hold over its audience, closing off other forms of cultural experience and therefore gaining a paramount role in determining the cultural content of our society. 74 As Button (2002) The economic and social background, which the 1953 flood was superimposed onto, meant that the flood acted as a facilitator for and catalyst to, changes that were already simmering within the British public conscience. Longer term changes in blame allocation and risk perception as charted by academics, such as Douglas, can clearly been seen as fringe phenomena of the 1953 discourse; in both the media analysis and language of government reports. Hannigan (1995) outlines three claims making groups, on which society's willingness to recognise and solve environmental issues rests; issue entrepreneurs in science, the mass media and politicians. 77 For the events of January 1953 these three groups all had a key role to play in the subsequent changes that were to occur both to policy and socially. It may be found that other situations in policy acceleration within the UK twentieth century discourse fit within this funnel effect model with three or more social sphere's interactions catalysed by a triggering or facilitating event. The case of the Clean Air Act works well as a comparison as it occurred in the same time frame as the Great Flood and therefore is subject to the same unique social dynamism, as discussed, in its evolution.
The Forgotten Tragedy-forgotten survivors:
As stated in the political analysis, the flood soon became a footnote in the twentieth century history of This undetected trauma resulting from events, which was overlooked in post-war disaster response is hugely contrasted in the response to the floods of summer 2007. Sir Pitt's interim report dedicates a whole section to the topic of health and well being in an event which had no direct deaths linked with it, focussing chiefly on the increase in mental health problems, anxiety and depression post flooding.
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Vulnerability in UK society may be seen as a gradually increasing idea, coupled with the loss of attitudes of resilience and solidarity that were prevalent post-war. However, analysis of the events of January 1953 and its aftermath, show that elements of this discourse were beginning to emerge and that the flood may have helped trigger a shift from a society of collectiveness and post-war stabilisation to one of modernist growth and individuality. shown that blame and individuality were starting to appear in British post-war societies by 1953.
The long term legacy of the devastation to the East coast of the UK in 1953 was not only in the physical and visible policy changes which saw sea defence improvement and the inception of a national warning system. The event it seems, through the pioneering Waverley Report, introduced Britain to the ideas of risk perception and assessment, twenty years before this field was defined by academics. This huge shift in policy coupled with the newly established reach of the mass media in its ability to shape national identity 89 were the main contributors to the floods position as a triggering event for the social changes that followed, introducing albeit subtly, the ideas of accountability and recreancy.
The three-sphere interaction, as shown in Figure 5 , highlights how the flood acted in bringing discourses that usually interact slowly over time together and focussed their discussion. However, it is naïve to consider that the trigger action provided by this event is the sole reason for the large changes both socially and in policy facilitated. As discussed, the larger social dynamism of the 1950s is key to how this event could paradoxically be both an accelerator for huge social improvement and also a forgotten event in UK twentieth century history.
It is not suggested that this event alone created a climate of blame, vulnerability and individualism that is prevalent in the UK's post-industrial society, however it has been shown that it was a vital event in enabling shifts that, although already emerging in UK society, may otherwise have taken decades in their growth.
Whether these findings, for either natural or technological disaster, as a facilitator for shifts in societies from community resilience to a climate of blame and individuality, can be extended beyond the UK would require further research and analysis. It may be posed that UK history is unique globally during this time-frame with its adoption of American capitalism coupled with the meteorological climate of low probability and low intensity disaster. However, without comparison across other similar countries disaster discourses' this is hard to ascertain.
Analysis has shown how a single environmental event in lieu of its economic and social costs can act as a key provider of change both to governance and society itself. Showing that if blame casting and accountability are measured in their use and formulation that positive can come from them through improvements to policy and in providing closure and post traumatic help to communities.
Ireland, resulting in 133 deaths-for further information see Cameron, 2002 
